Armand Andreozzi v. Warden McKean FCI by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-17-2020 
Armand Andreozzi v. Warden McKean FCI 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Armand Andreozzi v. Warden McKean FCI" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 901. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/901 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 




         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











WARDEN MCKEAN FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-15-cv-00011) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 3, 2020 
Before:  JORDAN, BIBAS, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 







 Armand Andreozzi appeals from the orders of the District Court denying his 
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and his motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to  
alter or amend that judgment.  We will affirm. 
 




   Andreozzi is a former member of the United States military who was convicted 
by general court martial of two sets of crimes in 1998—the rape of his former wife and 
related crimes, for which he was sentenced to 27 years in prison, and escape from prison 
and related crimes, for which he was sentenced to a consecutive term of 15 years in 
prison.  This case concerns a decision of the United States Parole Commission to deny 
Andreozzi parole on June 25, 2013.  That decision followed a hearing at which the 
Commission considered, inter alia:  (1) the testimony of Matthew Mann, an officer whom 
Andreozzi assaulted during his escape; (2) Andreozzi’s unsuccessful discharge from sex 
offender treatment; and (3) Andreozzi’s 2012 disciplinary charge for fighting. 
 Andreozzi, after exhausting his administrative remedies, filed through counsel the 
§ 2241 petition at issue here challenging the Commission’s June 25 decision.  He claimed 
that the Commission violated his rights at his hearing in two ways.  First, he claimed that 
the Commission failed to inform him, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 2.55(a), that he could 
request disclosure of the materials that the Commission would consider at his hearing.  
Second, he claimed that the Commission inappropriately considered Mann’s testimony 
because (according to him) he was currently serving his sentence for his rape-related 
convictions and Mann was not a “victim” of those crimes under 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(a)(6). 
 After the Government answered Andreozzi’s petition, then-Magistrate Judge 
Susan Paradise Baxter recommended that the District Court deny it on the merits.  In 
response, Andreozzi filed two counseled documents (neither of which mentioned the 
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other)—a motion to voluntarily dismiss his petition without prejudice (ECF No. 21), and 
a set of objections to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation on the merits (ECF No. 22).  
The District Court did not expressly rule on Andreozzi’s motion to voluntarily dismiss 
his petition.  Instead, District Judge Barbara Rothstein adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 
recommendation and denied Andreozzi’s petition on the merits.   
 Andreozzi then filed pro se:  (1) a motion for leave to proceed pro se; (2) a motion 
for a ruling on his motion to voluntarily dismiss his petition; and (3) a Rule 59(e) motion 
seeking relief from the denial of his petition on the merits.  (We construe the second and 
third of these documents as a single Rule 59(e) motion and will so refer to them 
hereafter.)  After Andreozzi filed those documents, former Magistrate Judge Baxter’s 
appointment as a District Judge was confirmed and the matter was reassigned to District 
Judge Baxter.  Judge Baxter then granted Andreozzi’s motion for leave to proceed pro se 
but later denied his Rule 59(e) motion.  Andreozzi appeals and challenges the District 
Court’s denial of both his habeas petition and his Rule 59(e) motion.1 
II. 
 
1 The Government initially filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as untimely, but it has 
withdrawn that motion.  We independently conclude that this appeal is timely as to both 
of the District Court’s rulings.  Andreozzi also does not require a certificate of 
appealability in order to appeal the denial of his § 2241 habeas petition.  See Reese v. 
Warden Phila. FDC, 904 F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir. 2018).  Thus, we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the denial of Andreozzi’s habeas petition is plenary.  
See Reese, 904 F.3d at 246.  We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), see Estate of Ware 
v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa., 871 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2017), and for relief under Rule 
59(e), except as to legal issues over which our review is plenary, see Blystone v. Horn, 




 We will affirm the District Court’s denial of Andreozzi’s habeas petition on the 
merits substantially for the reasons the District Court explained.2  Andreozzi’s most 
substantial argument on appeal is that the District Court should not have reached the 
merits at all and should instead have granted his motion to voluntarily dismiss his petition 
without prejudice.  As the District Court explained in denying Andreozzi’s Rule 59(e) 
motion, Andreozzi required court approval to voluntarily dismiss his petition without 
prejudice because the Government already had answered it and the Government did not 
stipulate to dismissal.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2); Estate of Ware, 871 F.3d at 285.  The 
District Court also construed its order denying Andreozzi’s habeas petition as having 
denied his motion to voluntarily dismiss it sub silentio.   
 
2 In brief, Andreozzi’s primary complaint is that the Parole Commission failed to provide 
him advance notice that it would consider Mann’s testimony, as purportedly required by 
28 C.F.R. § 2.55(a).  That regulation requires the Commission to give prisoners at least 
60 days before a hearing to “request disclosure of the reports and other documents to be 
used by the Commission in making its determination.”  28 C.F.R. § 2.55(a) (emphasis 
added).  That regulation by its terms does not require an opportunity to request the 
advanced disclosure of oral testimony.  See Phillips v. Brennan, 969 F.2d 384, 387 (7th 
Cir. 1992).  Even if it did, and leaving aside the fact that Andreozzi had received at least 
four previous § 2.55(a) notifications in connection with previous hearings, Andreozzi has 
not argued that he was prejudiced by the denial of an opportunity to request advanced 
disclosure.  Cf. United States ex rel. Schiano v. Luther, 954 F.2d 910, 914-16 (3d Cir. 
1992) (remanding for new parole hearing following a § 2.55(a) violation where the 
prisoner had no opportunity to contest undisclosed material even at his hearing and where 
the prisoner explained how he would have rebutted that material).  Andreozzi also has not 
meaningfully argued that a § 2.55(a) violation is prejudicial per se and we have located 
no authority suggesting that it is.  Cf. Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 178-80 (3d Cir. 
2010).  In light of these issues, we need not address the District Court’s conclusion that 
Andreozzi waived his rights under § 2.55(a) by electing to proceed with his hearing.  As 
for Andreozzi’s claim that Mann was not a “victim” of his allegedly operative 
convictions for purposes of 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(a)(6), the District Court properly concluded 
that the Commission could consider Mann’s testimony under 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(b)(1) 
instead.  Andreozzi has not meaningfully challenged that conclusion. 
 
 
The District Court, however, never explained why it denied Andreozzi leave to 
dismiss his petition without prejudice.  Ordinarily, a motion for voluntary dismissal 
without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) should be granted in the absence of prejudice to 
the opposing party.  See Estate of Ware, 871 F.3d at 285.  And ordinarily, a District 
Court’s failure to address a motion for voluntary dismissal would require us to remand 
for the District Court to exercise its discretion as to that motion in the first instance.  See 
Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603-04 (3d Cir. 1991).   
In this case, however, Andreozzi’s motion for voluntary dismissal failed even to 
invoke the District Court’s discretion.  Instead, Andreozzi’s counseled motion consisted 
solely of a bare request for dismissal that did not cite any authority and that did not 
otherwise explain the factual or legal basis for that request.  And Andreozzi, instead of 
explaining the basis for that request, went on to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 
recommendation on the merits.  Andreozzi’s objections did not mention his previous 
request for voluntary dismissal, and his filing of those objections was inconsistent with 
seeking a voluntary dismissal.   
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the District Court abused its 
discretion in failing to expressly rule on Andreozzi’s motion for voluntary dismissal 
without prejudice before denying his petition on the merits.  Cf. Hamm v. Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer Pharm., Inc., 187 F.3d 941, 951 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming denial of Rule 41(a)(2) 
motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice filed along with objections after a 
Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal on the merits where plaintiffs “provided no 
legitimate justification for their request,” where plaintiffs apparently sought merely to 
 
 
“avoid an adverse decision” on the merits, and where “voluntary dismissal would waste 
the substantial efforts expended by the magistrate judge”); Davis v. Huskipower Outdoor 
Equip. Corp., 936 F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming denial of Rule 41(a)(2) 
motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice where plaintiffs sought dismissal only 
“after the magistrate had considered the case and issued a comprehensive 
recommendation that was adverse to their position”). 
We also cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion in declining to 
permit a post-judgment voluntary dismissal on the basis of Andreozzi’s Rule 59(e) 
motion.  In that motion, Andreozzi argued for the first time that he requested dismissal 
without prejudice because he had discovered new evidence in support of new claims and 
wanted to withdraw his petition so that he could file another one with all of his claims 
and thereby avoid the dismissal of his new claims under the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine.  
Whatever the merits of that argument,3 it did not provide a basis for Rule 59(e) relief 
because Andreozzi could have raised it in his motion for a voluntary dismissal before the 
District Court denied his habeas petition on the merits.  See Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 
 
3 Andreozzi has not provided any information about his alleged new evidence or new 
claims.  If Andreozzi’s only basis for seeking to dismiss his petition without prejudice 
was to assert those new claims, however, then he could instead have sought to amend his 
petition with those new claims before or even after the District Court denied the petition.  
See Jang v. Boston Sci. Scimed, Inc., 729 F.3d 357, 367-68 (3d Cir. 2013).  And if there 
were some legitimate reason why Andreozzi could not yet assert his new claims in this 
action, then those claims might not be subject to dismissal under the abuse-of-the-writ 
doctrine in a second action.  See McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 488, 494 (1991); 
Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  In light of our 
disposition, however, we express no opinion on that issue. 
 
 
1698, 1703 (2020) (noting that Rule 59(e) is not a mechanism to raise “new arguments or 
evidence that the moving party could have raised before the decision issued”). 
Andreozzi raises two other argument regarding his Rule 59(e) motion, but they 
lack merit as well.  First, Andreozzi argues that reassignment of this case to Judge Baxter 
for Rule 59(e) purposes was improper because Judge Baxter made a recommendation in 
this case in her former capacity as a Magistrate Judge.  Andreozzi has not cited, and we 
have not located, anything suggesting that a District Judge cannot preside over a case 
merely because the judge was previously involved with the case as a Magistrate Judge.  
Cf. Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that “no 
statute, or principle of federal common law, forbids a district judge to reconsider an order 
that she issued when she was a magistrate judge of the same court”).  Judge Baxter’s 
previous recommendation on the merits also did not give rise to a disqualifying 
appearance of partiality because her view of the merits did not derive from any extra-
judicial source and did not “display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would 
make fair judgment impossible” in ruling on Andreozzi’s Rule 59(e) motion.  Liteky v. 
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 
Second, Andreozzi argued in his Rule 59(e) motion that the District Court’s denial  
of his habeas petition was the product of his counsel’s allegedly ineffective assistance.  
The District Court did not address his allegations in that regard, but they did not state a 
basis for Rule 59(e) relief.  Ineffective assistance of counsel generally is not grounds for 
relief from a civil judgment on the merits.  See Nelson v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 1118, 
1119, 1121 (10th Cir. 2006); Bell, 214 F.3d at 802; Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 
 
 
620 F.2d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 1980).  Even if it were, Andreozzi has not shown that his 
counsel’s performance was deficient or that anything he claims his counsel should have 
done might have made a difference. 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Appellee’s 
motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix is granted.  To the extent that the motion 
can also be construed as a motion to expand the record, it is denied as unnecessary. 
